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(57) ABSTRACT 
Systems and methods are disclosed for identifying domains 
as malicious based on Internet-wide DNS lookup patterns. 
Disclosed embodiments look for variance in the servers that 
look up a domain and also look at the popularity growth 
(quantity of queries from unique addresses) of a domain after 
registration to identify malicious domains. Other disclosed 
embodiments measure the similarity of servers that query a 
domain and cluster domains based on the similarity of those 
servers. Disclosed embodiments may use such temporal and 
spatial lookup patterns as input to a blacklist process to more 
effectively and quickly blacklist domains based on their Inter-
net-wide lookup patterns. 
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SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR 
IDENTIFYING MALICIOUS DOMAINS 
USING INTERNET-WIDE DNS LOOKUP 
PATTERNS 
2 
When the recursive servers send queries to a TLD server 
for resolving the 2LD domains names, the TLD server may 
store records of the queries. The TLD server, or a central 
repository, may aggregate the source IP addresses of the 
queries into /24 sub-networks. This may allow a TLD server 
or a central repository to monitor the number of queries for 
each domain. A query record may show the relationship 
between the domain names and the /24 sub-networks submit-
ting queries. Examples of a DNZA record and a DNS query 
This application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Appli-
cation No. 61/334,392 filed May 13, 2010, the disclosure of 
which is hereby incorporated by reference herein in its 
entirety. 
10 record are shown in Table 1. 
FIELD 
This disclosure is generally directed to systems and meth-
ods for analyzing the DNS lookup patterns from a large 
15 
authoritative top-level domain server and, more particularly, 
systems and methods for identifying unscrupulous domains 
by analyzing how the lookup patterns for unscrupulous 
domains differ from those for legitimate domains. 
BACKGROUND 
The growth of computer networking has brought with it 
domains used for unscrupulous activities. Such domains may 
20 
type 
DNZAentry 
Query record 
TABLE 1 
Data format examples 
example 
add-new example.com NS nsl.example.com 
example.com 111.111.111.0.22.22.22.0 3 
The DNZA entry shows that an "add-new" command cre-
ated a new domain example.com and the name space (NS) 
record is ns I .example.com. The query record shows that there 
were 3 queries from the /24 subnets of" 111.111.111.0" and 
"22.22.22.0" for the domain "example.com." On an average 
25 day, a TLD server may handle queries for 80 million different 
domains. 
be used for scams, phishing, spamming, botnet command-
and-control activities, etc. The ability to perpetrate such mali-
cious activity depends on coordinating a large collection of 
hosts to perform a particular activity. Operators of these large-
scale operations typically use the Domain Name System 
(DNS) to help direct hosts to the appropriate location on the 30 
network because the major task of the DNS system is to 
maintain the mapping between the host names and the Inter-
net protocol (IP) addresses of a Web site. In the case of attacks 
such as spam and phishing attacks, these domains may be 
used to direct victims to a Web site (or through a proxy) that 35 
is hosting malicious content. In the case ofbotnet command-
and-control, bots may locate the "controller" machine 
according to its domain name. 
For these reasons and others, the ability to identify domain 
names that correspond to unscrupulous activity or otherwise 40 
unwanted traffic may be extremely valuable. Characterizing 
the behavior of these domains may not only help identify 
domains used for malicious behavior, but may also help iden-
tify individual attacking hosts and victim hosts. 
Top-level domain (TLD) servers are responsible for main- 45 
taining zone information (usually second-level domains) and 
for answering the queries directed to registered domains. For 
example, VeriSign, Inc. operates the generic top-level 
domains (gTLDs) for .com and .net. The top-level domain 
servers generally maintain two kinds of dynamics about the 50 
second-level domains (2LDs). The first type ofinformation is 
the Domain Name Zone Alert (DNZA). This information 
includes data about changes in the zone, for example, whether 
a domain name was newly registered or a name server's 
Internet Protocol (IP) address was modified. The DNZA files 55 
track these changes. 
Once a domain gets registered, several basic entries, called 
Resource Records, are created to refer to the services for the 
domain. The major Resource Records may include, NS-type 
records that point to the authoritative name servers for the 
zone, MX-type records that point to the domains' mail serv-
ers, and A-type records that point to the host representing the 
domain. The NS- and MX-type records can further resolve to 
IP addresses. The number ofIP addresses associated with the 
NS- and MX-type records is typically much less than the 
number of the domains being registered because the same 
server may be repeatedly used by many different domains to 
hose DNS infrastructure. 
Certain methods of characterizing DNS lookup behavior 
characterize DNS lookup behavior from different vantage 
points, such as below the local recursive resolver within an 
organization. These methods recognize that hosts within a 
single enterprise may exhibit coordinated lookup behavior to 
malicious domains, so clustering their activity patterns may 
yield information about the reputation of individual domains. 
But, because malicious activity often relies on coordinated 
activity across multiple servers, the view of DNS lookup 
behavior below a single recursive DNS resolver fails to cap-
ture behavior unique to malicious domains but visible only 
from a perspective that captures lookup behavior across serv-
ers, among other things. 
For example, the Proactive Domain Blacklisting work by 
M. Felegyhazi, C. Kreibich, and V. Paxson in Third USENIX 
Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats 
(LEET '10), 2010, focuses on the domain registration and 
DNS zone information to predict the malicious use of 
domains. This study, however, fails to take advantage of the 
lookup patterns to the domains, including the addresses of the 
recursive DNS servers and number of queries from the serv-
60 ers. 
The second type of information concerns the DNS queries 
submitted by the recursive servers. A recursive server 
receives a DNS request from a user's computer and, in tum, 
sends a request to a top-level domain server to process the 
user's request. Each recursive server represents a different 
geographical region, and the recursive servers may be 
grouped into sub-network blocks by region using the prefix of 
the IP address of the recursive servers. The prefix may be 
the /24 sub-network prefix, and the recursive servers with the 65 
same prefix may be referred to as a sub-network, or a /24 
sub-network. 
SUMMARY 
Disclosed embodiments provide methods and systems for 
identifying malicious domains based on DNS lookup patterns 
from a large authoritative top-level domain server. Methods 
consistent with disclosed embodiments identify malicious 
US 8,713,676 B2 
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domains based on, for example, the degree of variance in the 
servers that look up the domains, the clustering of servers that 
look up the domains, the length of time after registration that 
it takes for a domain to become widely popular, etc. Once 
malicious or potentially malicious domains are identified, the 
system may blacklist the sites to curb the malicious behavior, 
and may also help identify victim hosts. 
Consistent with disclosed embodiments, a method is pro-
vided for determining that a newly-registered domain is 
potentially malicious. The method may include determining 10 
the number of unique servers that sent a query for the newly-
registered domain during a period of time and determining 
whether the number of unique servers exceeds a predeter-
mined threshold of servers. The method may further include 
flagging the newly-registered domain as potentially mali- 15 
cious when it is determined that the number of unique servers 
exceeds the predetermined threshold of servers. In some 
embodiments, the method may further include identifying an 
IP address associated with a registration record for the newly-
registered domain, determining a confidence level based on 20 
whether the IP address is associated with a tainted server, and 
automatically adding the newly-registered domain to a black-
list when the confidence level is high. In some embodiments 
the confidence level may be based on an amount by which the 
number of unique servers exceeds the predetermined thresh- 25 
old of servers. 
4 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in 
and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate several 
embodiments and, together with the description, serve to 
explain the disclosed principles. In the drawings: 
FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary malicious 
domain identification system that may be used to implement 
disclosed embodiments; 
FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary process 
for identifying malicious domains based on temporal lookup 
patterns, consistent with disclosed embodiments; 
FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary process 
for identifying malicious domains based on variability, con-
sistent with disclosed embodiments; 
FIG. 4 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary process 
for identifying malicious domains based on spatial lookup 
patterns, consistent with disclosed embodiments; and 
FIG. 5 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary process 
for identifying malicious domains based on registration 
records, consistent with disclosed embodiments. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Methods and systems consisted with disclosed embodi-
ments examine the temporal and spatial characteristics of 
looknp patterns for domains to detect domains used for 
unscrupulous activities, such as spam, malware, phishing 
attacks, and botnet command-and-control activities. 
In particular, disclosed embodiments may characterize 
looknp patterns based on an Internet-wide view of these 
looknp patterns. This perspective allows embodiments to 
identify IP sub-networks that host recursive resolvers that 
issue a looknp for a particular domain. This global perspec-
Consistent with other disclosed embodiments, a system is 
provided for identifying an Internet domain as potentially 
malicious. The system may comprise a processor and a 
memory storing instructions that, when executed by the pro- 30 
cessor, cause the processor to perform operations. The opera-
tions may comprise identifying unique servers that query the 
domain during a first day and during a second day. The opera-
tions may further comprise determining the similarity of the 
servers that queried the domain during the first day the servers 
that queried the domain during the second day and determin-
ing whether the similarity of the servers meets a predeter-
mined threshold. The operations may further comprise flag-
ging the domain as potentially malicious when it is 
determined that the similarity of the servers meets a prede-
termined threshold. In some embodiments, the method may 
further comprise adjusting the predetermined threshold base 
35 tive, combined with information about when a particular 
domain was registered, allows embodiments to characterize 
both the spatial and temporal lookup patterns for individual 
domains (for example, "which server is looking up what, and 
when?") and identify characteristics unique to domains that 
on data used to flag the domain as potentially malicious. 
Consistent with disclosed embodiments, a method is pro-
vided for identifying an Internet domain as potentially mali-
cious. The method may include identifying a set of domains, 
the set including at least one known malicious domain and 
determining the number of servers that query each domain in 
the set for each day over a period of time. For a plurality of 
pairs of domains from the set of domains, the method may 
further include analyzing the similarity of servers that queried 
a first domain of the pair of domains and servers that queried 
a second domain of the pair of domains. The method may 
further include grouping the domains based on the analyzing 
and flagging the domains in a group that contains the known 
malicious domain as potentially malicious. In some embodi-
ments, each server in the set of servers may be an aggregation 
of servers sharing the same IP address prefix. In other 
embodiments, 
Consistent with other disclosed embodiments, computer-
readable media, such as storage devices, may store program 
instructions that are executable by one or more processors to 
implement any of the methods, disclosed herein. 
It is to be understood that both the foregoing general 
description and the following detailed description are exem-
plary and explanatory only and are not restrictive of the dis-
closed embodiments, as claimed. 
40 are associated with malicious behavior. 
Disclosed embodiments may look for variance in the serv-
ers that look up a domain because some malicious domains, 
such as botnet and phishing domains, tend to exhibit more 
variance in the servers that look up these domains. Disclosed 
45 embodiments also look at the popularity growth of a domain 
after registration because malicious sites tend to become 
popular considerably more quickly after initial registration 
time than legitimate sites. In such embodiments, the system 
uses the quantity of queries from the servers for a period of 
50 time after the domains are registered to identify malicious 
domains. 
Other disclosed embodiments measure the similarity of 
servers that query a domain and cluster domains based on the 
similarity of those servers. Such network-wide spatial lookup 
55 patterns may identify malicious domains because domains 
that are used for malicious purposes may be looked up by 
similar groups of servers. Disclosed embodiments may use 
such spatial lookup patterns as input to a blacklist process. 
Thus, disclosed embodiments use the distinct spatial and 
60 temporal characteristics of malicious domains, and their ten-
dency to exhibit similar looknp behavior, to more effectively 
and quickly blacklist domains based on these differing 
looknp patterns. 
To characterize DNS looknp patterns across servers, dis-
65 closed embodiments use information about DNS lookups 
collected from top-level domain servers, such as the VeriSign 
top-level domain servers, coupled with registration informa-
US 8,713,676 B2 
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tion about these domains. These two pieces of information 
allow disclosed embodiments to characterize the spatial prop-
erties ofDNS lookups across the Internet. Disclosed embodi-
ments perform a joint analysis with information about when 
the domains were registered to explore the temporal proper-
ties of DNS lookups after their registration time. 
6 
ing DNS traffic data, so long as the traffic data represents a 
top-level domain view of the DNS requests. 
Reference will now be made in detail to exemplary 
embodiments, examples of which are illustrated in the 
accompanying drawings. Wherever convenient, the same ref-
erence numbers will be used throughout the drawings to refer 
to the same or like parts. 
FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary malicious 
domain identification system 100 that may be used to imple-
ment disclosed embodiments, including exemplary system 
components. The components and arrangement, however, 
may be varied. Central repository server 120 may include a 
processor 122, a memory 123, input/output (I/O) devices (not 
shown), and storage 121. Central repository server 120 may 
Programs 124 may also include an analysis program that 
reads the information from the domain name servers and 
analyzes the data to determine spatial and temporal lookup 
patterns for various domains and a reporting program that 
generates output representing domains suspected of mali-
cious activity. Programs 124 may also include an integrative 
support program that links the other programs and allows 
10 them to use a common database, provides a common user 
interface, performs basic bookkeeping tasks (such as deleting 
the collected data after the data has been analyzed), provides 
user guidance and help, etc. Memory 123 may also include 
15 other programs that perform other functions and processes, 
such as programs that provide communication support, Inter-
be implemented in various ways. For example, central reposi- 20 
tory server 120 may be a general purpose computer, a server, 
a mainframe computer, or any combination of these compo-
nents. Central repository server 120 may communicate over a 
link with network 115. For example, the link may be a direct 
communication link, a LAN, a WAN, or other suitable con- 25 
nection. Network 115 may include the Internet. Central 
repository server 120 may be standalone or it may be part of 
a subsystem, which may, in tum, be part of a larger system, 
such as a legacy name server system. 
Processor 122 may include one or more kuown processing 30 
devices, such as a microprocessor from the Pentium™ or 
Xeon™ family manufactured by Intel™, the Turion™ family 
manufactured by AMD™, or any of various processors manu-
factured by Sun Microsystems. Memory 123 may include one 
net access, etc. 
Methods, systems, and articles of manufacture consistent 
with disclosed embodiments are not limited to separate pro-
grams or computers configured to perform dedicated tasks. 
For example, memory 123 may be configured with a mali-
cious domain identification program 124 that performs sev-
eral functions when executed by processor 122. For example, 
memory 123 may include a single program 124 that performs 
the functions of the malicious domain identification system, 
or program 124 could comprise multiple programs. More-
over, processor 122 may execute one or more programs 
located remotely from central repository server 120. For 
example, central repository server 120 may access one or 
more remote programs that, when executed, perform func-
tions related to disclosed embodiments. 
Memory 123 may be also be configured with an operating 
system (not shown) that performs several functions well 
kuown in the art when executed by central repository server 
120. By way of example, the operating system may be 
Microsoft Windows™, Unix™, Linux™, Solaris™, or some 
other operating system. 
Central repository server 120 may include one or more I/O 
devices (not shown) that allow data to be received and/or 
or more storage devices configured to store information used 35 
by processor 122 to perform certain functions related to dis-
closed embodiments. Storage 121 may include a volatile or 
non-volatile, magnetic, semiconductor, tape, optical, remov-
able, nonremovable, or other type of storage device or com-
puter-readable medium. 
In one embodiment, memory 123 may include one or more 
malicious domain identification programs or subprograms 
124 loaded from storage 121 or elsewhere that, when 
executed by processor 122, perform various procedures, 
operations, or processes consistent with disclosed embodi- 45 
ments. For example, memory 123 may include a collection 
program that queries various top-level or second-level 
domain name servers and collects data from each server. In 
one embodiment, the collection program may perform pro-
cedures, operations, or processes disclosed in U.S. patent 50 
application Ser. No. 13/077,344, directed to SYSTEMS AND 
METHODS FOR COLLECTING AND STORING NET-
WORK TRAFFIC DATA, filed Mar. 31, 2011, which is incor-
porated herein by reference. For example, memory 123 may 
include a network traffic collection program that goes to 
various edge sites and imports log files from each site and a 
network traffic processing program that reads the log files to 
extract data, formats the extracted data, and stores the data in 
40 transmitted by central repository server 120. I/O devices may 
also include one or more digital and/or analog communica-
tion input/output devices that allow central repository server 
120 to communicate with other machines and devices, such as 
top-level domain name server 140, or client computers (not 
shown). Client computers may provide requests from users 
representing queries directed to the data stored in storage 121 
or data repository 130. Central repository server 120 may 
receive data from external machines and devices and output 
data to external machines and devices via I/O devices. The 
configuration and number of input and/or output devices 
incorporated in I/O devices may vary as appropriate for cer-
tain embodiments. 
Central repository server 120 may also be communica-
tively connected to one or more data repositories 130, e.g., 
55 through network 115. Data repository 130 may include one or 
more files or databases 131 that store information and are 
a database or other data repository. In other embodiments, the 
edge sites may extract data from the log files and the network 60 
traffic collection program may collect and store the extracted 
files. In some embodiments, the stored data may have a for-
mat similar to the DNZA record and the DNS query record 
shown in Table 1, or the stored data may be queried and 
formatted to supply the information shown in the DNZA 65 
record and the DNS query record of Table 1. However, 
embodiments are not limited to a specific manner of collect-
accessed and/or managed through central repository server 
120. By way of example, the databases may be Oracle™ 
databases, Sybase™ databases, other relational databases, or 
non-relational databases, such as HBase, Cassandra, or 
Hadoop sequence files. The databases or other files may 
include, for example, data and information related to DNS 
requests, domain registration information, etc. Data reposi-
tory 130 may store domain registration information as well as 
DNS query information relating to DNS requests. Systems 
and methods of disclosed embodiments, however, are not 
limited to separate databases or the use of a database. 
US 8,713,676 B2 
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Central repository server 120 may be communicatively 
connected to one or more domain servers 140 through net-
work 115. In some embodiments, domain server 140 may be 
owned or operated by a root name server operator, known as 
a top-level domain name server. In some embodiments, 
domain server 140 may be a recursive server Domain server 
140 may process DNS packet requests and store information 
about the requests, such as the domain requested, the date of 
the request, and the server that requested the domain, for 
example, in log files. Domain server 140 may include proces- 10 
sor 142, storage 141, and memory 143. Storage 141 may be a 
volatile or non-volatile, magnetic, semiconductor, tape, opti-
cal, removable, nonremovable, or other type of storage device 
or computer-readable medium and may store the log files. 
Domain server 140 may also be connected to data repository 15 
130. 
8 
(/24 sub-network). When a domain is queried by many dif-
ferent regions, it may be considered widely "popular." How-
ever, it takes a relatively long period of time for legitimate 
domains to become popular. In contrast, malicious domains 
may see a high number of unique servers in a short period of 
time after registration. Therefore, central repository server 
120 may determine the number of unique querying servers for 
each of the identified domains. 
Next, in step 220, central repository server 120 may deter-
mine whether the number of unique querying servers exceeds 
a predetermined threshold. For example, malicious domains 
often average more than 50 unique querying servers per day, 
so some embodiments may use a predetermined threshold of 
50. However, embodiments are not limited to a specific value 
for the threshold, so long as the threshold represents a value 
that distinguishes an expected legitimate number of unique 
querying servers from an unexpected number If central 
repository server 120 does determine that the number of 
querying servers exceeds the threshold (step 220, Yes), then in 
FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary process 
200 for identifying malicious domains based on temporal 
lookup patterns, consistent with disclosed embodiments. 
Malicious domains are typically queried by a much wider 
range of sub-networks, particularly for newly registered 
domains. Domains that appear in blacklists are queried by 
thousands of distinct recursive servers, often within a few 
days of when the domain was registered. This varies mark-
edly from the behavior of newly registered legitimate 
domains, which become "popular" less quickly. Central 
repository server 120 may implement process 200 to identify 
malicious domains based on, for example, the number of 
queries to the domain in a period after registration, the num-
ber of unique recursive servers or sub-networks making those 
queries, etc. 
20 step 230, central repository server 120 may identify the 
domain as malicious or potentially malicious. For example, 
central repository server 120 may create a report or display 
listing the domain. The report may be sent to or printed by a 
user for further investigation. Alternatively, the domain may 
25 be automatically added to one or more black lists. In yet other 
embodiments, central repository server 120 may send the 
domain to a command and control center for further investi-
gation. 
In some embodiments (not shown), central repository 
30 server 120 may calculate a confidence level for the domain. 
For example, ifthe threshold is 50 unique querying servers 
per day and domains with more than this are identified as 
potentially malicious, if a particular domain has 55 unique 
querying servers, the confidence level for the particular 
In step 205, central repository server 120 may identify a 
recently registered domain or domains. For example, central 
repository server 120 may use the "addnew" command in the 
zone DNZA files to identify the registration of new domains. 
In other embodiments, registration information may be stored 
35 domain may be low because the number of unique querying 
servers is close to the threshold. On the other hand, if the 
particular domain has 200 unique querying servers, the con-
fidence level for the particular domain may be high because 
the number of unique querying servers exceeds the threshold 
in a database, for example, in data repository 130. In some 
embodiments, central repository server may select domains 
registered at least 1 day ago and not more than two months 
ago. In other embodiments, central repository server may 
select domains registered in the past six months. Although 
embodiments are not limited to a specific time period, a recent 
time period may be preferred in some embodiments because 
identifying malicious domains in a short period of time after 
registration may alleviate or prevent the harmful impact of the 45 
malicious domains. Central repository server 120 may iden-
tify potentially malicious domains in as little as a few days 
after registration. However, because not all domains exhibit 
malicious behavior in the first days after registration, embodi-
ments may select domains registered over a larger period, 50 
such as the most recent one or two months. 
40 by a large amount. In such embodiments, when a confidence 
level is high, central repository server 120 may automatically 
add the domain to a blacklist but when the confidence level is 
low, central repository server 120 may perform other actions, 
In step 210, central repository server 120 may look at DNS 
packet requests for the identified domain(s) over a period of 
time. For example, central repository server 120 may use log 
records stored at a TLD server or may use a query record such 55 
as the query record shown in Table 1. The period of time for 
which central repository server 120 queries the DNS traffic 
may be set by a system parameter or by a user, In some 
embodiments, the period of time may be 15 days. In other 
embodiments, the period of time may be 20 days, 25 days, 30 60 
days or more. 
Once central repository server 120 receives the results of 
the query, in step 215, central repository server 120 may 
determine the number of unique servers responsible for the 
DNS requests for each domain. In certain embodiments, a 65 
server may represent the recursive server, or the collection of 
recursive servers represented by a particular IP address prefix 
such as restricting the traffic to the domain or presenting the 
domain to a user for further investigation, or adding the 
domain to a "watch list." 
If the number of unique querying servers does not exceed a 
predetermined threshold (step 220, No) then, in step 225, 
central repository server 120 may determine whether the 
average number of daily queries exceeds a predetermined 
threshold. If so (step 225, Yes), then the domain is identified 
as malicious or potentially malicious, as discussed above. In 
step 235, central repository server 120 may determine 
whether any remaining identified domains exist. If so (step 
235, Yes), then central repository server 120 may process the 
next domain using steps 220 through 230. If no additional 
domains remain (step 235, No), then process 200 ends. 
In some embodiments (not shown), an investigation into 
the domains identified as malicious may indicate that the 
threshold value needs to be adjusted. In such embodiments, 
central repository server 120 may enable a user to adjust the 
threshold so that fewer legitimate domains are identified as 
potentially malicious, or so that more malicious domains are 
captured by the threshold. 
FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary process 
300 for identifying malicious domains based on variability, 
consistent with disclosed embodiments. Domains associated 
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with scams (e.g. phishing) and botnets exhibit more churn, for 
example, irregular variability in the number of servers that 
query the domain. Although the set of recursive servers look-
ing up any domain does vary from day-to-day, this variability 
is much more irregular for domains that are associated with 
spam and phishing attacks. Central repository server 120 may 
use process 300 to identify domains associated with such 
malicious activity. 
In step 305, central repository server 120 may query the 
DNS traffic for a period of time for a particular domain. In one 10 
embodiment the period of time may be one month, but the 
period of time may be any period of time that is statistically 
significant, and embodiments are not limited to any specific 
period of time. In step 310, central repository server 120 
creates a set of the servers or networks that queried the par- 15 
ticular domain for each day in the period. In some embodi-
ments, central repository server 120 may use unique recursive 
servers, but in other embodiments central repository server 
120 may aggregate the IP addresses of the DNS traffic using 
a prefix of the IP address (e.g. to the level of /24 sub-network 20 
blocks), as described above, and form the set at the level of the 
prefix addresses. In other embodiments, central repository 
server 120 may aggregate the corresponding Autonomous 
System (AS) numbers of the /24 sub-network blocks to form 
the set. In certain embodiments, a server may represent the 
recursive server, or the collection of recursive servers repre- 25 
sented by a particular IP address prefix (/24 sub-network), or 
by the collection of recursive servers represented by a par-
ticular AS number. 
In step 315, central repository server 120 may determine a 
value representing the similarity of the servers that query the 30 
domain for pairs of consecutive days. In some embodiments, 
the value may be a J accard index for the domain. For example, 
if the set of servers querying the domain on a first day is 
represented by A and the set of servers querying the domain 
on a second day is represented by B, the Jaccard index forthe 35 
two days may be represented as 
J(A B) _ IA n Bl 
' - IA UBI' 
10 
because the Jaccard index is close to the threshold. On the 
other hand, if the particular domain has a Jaccard index of 
zero, the confidence level for the particular domain may be 
high because the index falls well below the threshold. In such 
embodiments, when a confidence level is high, central reposi-
tory server 120 may automatically add the domain to a black-
list but when the confidence level is low, central repository 
server 120 may perform other actions, such as restricting the 
traffic to the domain or presenting the domain to a user for 
further investigation, or adding the domain to a "watch list." 
If no Jaccard indexes meet a predetermined threshold (step 
320, No) then, in step 325, central repository server 120 may 
determine whether the series of Jaccard indexes for the 
domain demonstrates high variability. For example, central 
repository server 120 may use a coefficient of variation (a 
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) to measure the 
variability of the series ofJaccard indexes. A large coefficient 
value indicates more dynamic change in the series. In some 
embodiments a coefficient greater than one may indicate high 
variability in the series of Jaccard indexes. If central reposi-
tory server 120 determines that the series of Jaccard indexes 
exhibits high variability (step 325, Yes) then, in step 330, 
central repository server 120 may identify the domain as 
malicious or potentially malicious, as described above. Cen-
tral repository server 120 may repeat process 300 for a num-
ber of domains. In some embodiments, central repository 
server 120 may select the domains at random for process 300. 
FIG. 4 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary process 
400 for identifying malicious domains based on spatial 
lookup patterns, consistent with disclosed embodiments. 
Domains that exhibit similar spatial lookup patterns also 
exhibit other similarities. Central repository server 120 may 
use process 400 to create clusters of domains by grouping 
domains together when they are looked up by similar groups 
of servers and use the clustering to identify domains as poten-
tially malicious. 
In step 410, central repository server 120 may query the 
DNS traffic for a period of time for a set of domains, In some 
embodiments, the set of domains includes at least some 
kuown malicious domains. The set may include domains 
selected at random in addition to kuown malicious domains. 
with the value of J(A,B) ranging from zero to one. To deter-
mine a series of Jaccard indexes, central repository server 120 
may calculate a Jaccard index for each pair of consecutive 
days in a period of days. In this manner, central repository 
server 120 may use the Jaccard index to check the similarity 
of the sets' dynamics over time. 
40 In one embodiment the period of time may be a week, but the 
period of time may be any period of time that is statistically 
significant and embodiments are not limited to any specific 
period of time. In step 410, central repository server 120 may 
create a set of servers that query each domain over the period 
In step 320, central repository server 120 may determine 
whether any of the Jaccard indexes meet a predetermined 
threshold. For example, malicious domains sometimes have 
45 of time. The set of servers may be recursive servers, an aggre-
gation of the recursive servers to the level of /24 sub-network 
blocks (i.e. using the prefix of the IP address of the server), 
etc. Central repository server 120 may use any of the tech-
niques described above with regard to FIG. 3 to gather and no overlapping servers that query the domain from one day to 
the next while legitimate domains have a more consistent 
level of overlapping servers. Accordingly, embodiments may 
use a Jaccard index of 0.1 for the threshold, so that any 
Jaccard indexes below 0.1 meet the threshold. Malicious 
domains also exhibit a high number of queries from the same 
servers day-to-day, so some embodiments may use a thresh-
oldof0.5, with any Jaccardindex greaterthan 0.5 meetingthe 
threshold. In certain embodiments, if any Jaccard index in the 
series of Jaccard indexes for the domain meets the threshold 
(step 320, Yes) then, in step 330, central repository server 120 
may identify the domain as potentially malicious, for 
example, in the manner described with regard to step 230 of 60 
FIG. 2. 
50 aggregate the set of servers. In some embodiments, central 
repository server 120 may use a subset of the sets created 
during process 300 as input for step 410. 
In step 415, central repository server 120 may determine 
the pairwise similarity between domains in the set of 
55 
domains. Central repository server 120 may measure the 
similarity among domains in the set by using a pairwise 
Jaccard index of the servers that query the domains. A pair-
wise similarity index may be represented by the formula 
In some embodiments (not shown), central repository 
server 120 may calculate a confidence level for the domain. 
For example, if the threshold is a Jaccard index of 0.1 and 
domains with less than this are identified as potentially mali- 65 
cious, if a particular domain has a Jaccard index of0.09, the 
confidence level for the particular domain may be low 
n 
~J(a;,b;) 
S(A, B) = _;~_i ---
n 
where A is a domain with the set of querying servers {a1 , 
a2 , ... an} and B is a different domain with a set of querying 
servers {b1 , b2 , ... bn} overndays (i.e. theperiodoftime) and 
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J (a,, b,) is the Jaccard index of set a, and b,. Central repository 
server 120 may calculate the pairwise similarity between 
each pair of domains in the set, or may calculate the similari-
ties on a subset of the total number of pairs, for example, 
stopping after 10,000 comparisons. 
In step 420, central repository server 120 may group 
domains based on the pairwise similarity using single-linkage 
clustering, as is known in the art. Single-linkage clustering is 
12 
legitimate domain, central repository server 120 may not 
consider the server tainted. In certain embodiments, the 
server may be an AS, which represents a collection of IP 
address prefixes. If the IP addresses are associated with a 
tainted server (step 515, Yes) then, in step 520, central reposi-
tory server 120 may flag the domain as potentially malicious. 
Some ASes may be known to host resource records only for 
malicious domains. In such a circumstance, central repository 
server 120 may determine that a high confidence level that a a method of calculating distances between clusters. In step 
425, central repository server 120 may identify the clusters 
that include the known malicious domains and identify the 
domains in the cluster as potentially malicious, as discussed 
above with regard to step 230 of FIG. 2. 
10 domain with an IP address associated with the AS is mali-
In some embodiments (not shown), central repository 
server 120 may calculate a confidence level for the groups. 15 
For example, if a group contains three known malicious 
domains, the confidence level for the group may be high. On 
the other hand, if the particular domain has one or more 
known legitimate sites, the confidence level may be low. In 
such embodiments, when a confidence level is high, central 20 
repository server 120 may automatically add the domain to a 
blacklist but when the confidence level is low, central reposi-
tory server 120 may perform other actions, such as restricting 
the traffic to the domain or presenting the domain to a user for 
further investigation, or adding the domain to a "watch list." 25 
In some embodiments (not shown), central repository 
server may include known legitimate domains in the set of 
domains. In such an embodiment, central repository server 
may identify domains that do not group with the legitimate 
domains as malicious, although such identified domains may 30 
have a low confidence level. 
FIG. 5 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary process 
500 for identifying potentially malicious domains based on 
registration records, consistent with disclosed embodiments. 
Many newly registered (second-level) domains use resource 35 
records that have been used by other existing domains. For 
example, the IP addresses of NS-type, MX-type, and A-type 
records may be shared by multiple domains. Malicious 
domains often reuse IP addresses belonging to a small set of 
Autonomous Systems (ASes). Autonomous Systems are col- 40 
lections of IP addresses with a common prefix. Central 
repository server 120 may use process 500 to identify poten-
tially malicious domains based on the IP addresses obtained 
from the resource records. 
In step 505, central repository server 120 may read the 45 
resource records associated with a domain. As explained 
above, the resource records may include information needed 
to register the domain and are supplied at the time of regis-
tration. Resource records include the NS-type, the A-type, 
and the MX-type of records, although disclosed embodi- 50 
ments are not limited to these particular resource records. 
In step 510, central repository server 120 may identify the 
IP address associated with each resource record. For example, 
the NS-type record identifies an IP address of an authoritative 
name server, the MX-type record identifies a mail exchange 55 
server IP address, and the A-type record identifies a host IP 
address. Disclosed embodiments may also use the IP address 
of other resource records. 
In step 515, central repository server 120 may determine 
whether one or more of the identified IP addresses are asso- 60 
CIOUS. 
In some embodiments, if central repository server 120 flags 
the domain as potentially malicious, then central repository 
server 120 may further analyze the DNS lookup patterns of 
the domain, for example, using one or more of processes 200, 
300, and 400, described above. In other embodiments, central 
repository server 120 may use process 500 in determining a 
confidence level for a domain flagged as malicious by one or 
more of processes 200, 300, and 400. For example, if a 
domain was flagged as malicious by process 200, central 
repository server 120 may initiate process 500 for the flagged 
domain. If process 500 also flags the domain as potentially 
malicious, central repository server 120 may determine that 
the confidence level is high that the domain is malicious and 
add the domain automatically to a blacklist. Conversely, if 
process 500 does not flag the domain as malicious, then 
central repository server 120 may determine that the confi-
dence level is low. If the confidence level is low, central 
repository server 120 may cause the traffic to the domain to be 
limited, or may add the domain to a list of domains to be 
watched, e.g. through process 200 or 300. 
Disclosed embodiments may use a combination of pro-
cesses 200-500 to determine a confidence level for the 
domain. For example, if central repository server 120 identi-
fies the domain as potentially malicious using process 200 but 
not using process 300 or process 500, the confidence level 
may be considered low. However, if central repository server 
120 identifies the domain as potentially malicious using pro-
cess 200 and 500, the confidence level may be considered 
high. Accordingly, central repository server 120 may analyze 
whether a domain has been flagged as potentially malicious 
by one or more of the methods disclose herein and determine 
a confidence level based on the analysis. As discussed above, 
if central repository server 120 determines that the confidence 
level is high, a domain may be added automatically to a 
blacklist. 
Once a recently registered domain has been identified as 
potentially malicious, disclosed embodiments may also 
monitor the country-level information ofDNS looknps forthe 
domain. Central repository server 120 may determine the 
country-level information by getting the approximate latitude 
and longitude of the recursive servers, or of the region repre-
sented by the prefix of the IP address of the recursive servers, 
that query the domain. This information may show how mal-
ware propagates geographically For example, central reposi-
tory server 120 may determine from what countries the high-
est number of queries are coming from. In response, central 
repository server 120 may generate data used to identify those 
countries as in need of increased security measures. Central 
repository server 120 may also determine what countries have 
servers which have recently been started querying the 
domain. These countries may also be identified as in need of 
increased security measures. 
ciated with a tainted server. For example, central repository 
server 120 may categorize a server as tainted if it is associated 
with a predetermined percentage of known malicious 
domains. For example, if more than 20% of the domains 
associated with a server are known to be malicious, then 
central repository server 120 may consider the server tainted. 
In other embodiments, if a server is associated with a known 
The foregoing descriptions have been presented for pur-
65 poses of illustration and description. They are not exhaustive 
and do not limit the disclosed embodiments to the precise 
form disclosed. Modifications and variations are possible in 
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light of the above teachings or may be acquired from practic-
ing the disclosed embodiments. For example, the described 
implementation includes software, but the disclosed embodi-
ments may be implemented as a combination ofhardware and 
software or in firmware. Examples of hardware include com-
puting or processing systems, including personal computers, 
servers, laptops, mainframes, micro-processors, and the like. 
Additionally, although disclosed aspects are described as 
being stored in a memory on a computer, one skilled in the art 
will appreciate that these aspects can also be stored on other 10 
types of computer-readable storage media, such as secondary 
storage devices, like hard disks, floppy disks, a CD-ROM, 
USB media, DVD, or other forms of RAM or ROM. 
Computer programs based on the written description and 
disclosed methods are within the skill of an experienced 15 
developer. The various programs or program modules can be 
created using any of the techniques known to one skilled in 
the art or can be designed in connection with existing soft-
ware. For example, program sections or program modules can 
be designed in or by means of .Net Framework, .Net Compact 20 
Framework (and related languages, such as Visual Basic, C, 
etc.), XML, Java, C++, JavaScript, HTML, HTML/AJAX, 
Flex, Silverlight, or any other now known or later created 
programming language. One or more of such software sec-
tions or modules can be integrated into a computer system or 25 
existing browser software. 
Other embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the 
art from consideration of the specification and practice of the 
embodiments disclosed herein. The recitations in the claims 
are to be interpreted broadly based on the language employed 30 
in the claims and not limited to examples described in the 
present specification or during the prosecution of the appli-
cation, which examples are to be construed non-exclusive. 
Further, the steps of the disclosed methods may be modified 
in any manner, including by reordering steps and/or inserting 35 
or deleting steps. It is intended, therefore, that the specifica-
tion and examples be considered as exemplary only, with a 
true scope and spirit being indicated by the following claims 
and their full scope equivalents. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A computer-implemented method of determining that a 
newly-registered domain is potentially malicious, the method 
comprising: 
40 
determining, by a processor, a number of unique name 45 
servers that sent a query forthe newly-registered domain 
during a period of time; 
determining, by the processor, that the number of unique 
servers exceeds a predetermined threshold of servers; 
identifying the newly-registered domain as one of mali- 50 
cious and potentially malicious when it is determined 
that the number of unique name servers exceeds the 
predetermined threshold of servers; 
in response to determining that the number of unique name 
servers exceeds the predetermined threshold of servers, 55 
determining a confidence level based on an amount by 
which the number of unique name servers exceeds the 
predetermined threshold of servers; and 
automatically adding the newly-registered domain to a 
blacklist when the confidence level is high. 60 
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
for the period of time, determining an average number of 
queries per day for the newly registered domain; 
determining that the average number of queries exceeds a 
predetermined threshold of queries per day; and 65 
identifying the newly-registered domain as one of mali-
cious and potentially malicious in response to determin-
14 
ing that the average number of queries exceeds a prede-
termined threshold of queries per day. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein each unique name server 
is an aggregation of name servers sharing a same IP address 
prefix. 
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
in response to determining that the number of unique name 
servers exceeds the predetermined threshold of servers, 
determining a confidence level based on an amount by 
which the number of unique name servers exceeds the 
predetermined threshold of servers; and 
limiting traffic to the newly-registered domain when the 
confidence level is not high. 
5. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
adjusting the predetermined threshold of servers based on 
data used to identify the newly-registered domain as one 
of malicious and potentially malicious. 
6. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
responsive to identifying the newly-registered domain as 
one of malicious and potentially malicious: 
identifying an IP address associated with a registration 
record for the newly-registered domain, and 
determining a confidence level based on whether the IP 
address is associated with a tainted server. 
7. A system for determining that a newly-registered 
domain is potentially malicious, the system comprising: 
a processor; and 
a memory having instructions, that when executed by the 
processor, cause the processor to perform operations 
including: 
determining, by a processor, a number of unique name 
servers that sent a query for the newly-registered 
domain during a period of time, 
determining, by the processor, that the number of unique 
name servers exceeds a predetermined threshold of 
servers; 
identifying the newly-registered domain as one of mali-
cious and potentially malicious in response to deter-
mining that the number of unique name servers 
exceeds the predetermined threshold of servers; and 
responsive to identifying the newly-registered domain 
as one of malicious and potentially malicious: 
identifying an IP address associated with a registration 
record for the newly-registered domain, and 
determining a confidence level based on whether the IP 
address is associated with a tainted server. 
8. The system of claim 7, wherein the operations performed 
by the processor further comprise: 
for the period of time, determining an average number of 
queries per day for the newly-registered domain; 
determining that the average number of queries exceeds a 
predetermined threshold of queries per day; and 
identifying the newly-registered domain as one of mali-
cious and potentially malicious when it is determined 
that the average number of queries exceeds a predeter-
mined threshold of queries per day. 
9. The system of claim 7, wherein each unique server is an 
aggregation of servers sharing a same IP address prefix. 
10. A tangible non-transitory computer-readable medium 
storing instructions for determining that a newly-registered 
domain is potentially malicious, the instructions causing one 
or more computer processors to perform operations, compris-
ing: 
determining a number of unique name servers that sent a 
query for the newly-registered domain during a period of 
time; 
US 8,713,676 B2 
15 
determining that the number of unique name servers 
exceeds a predetermined threshold of servers; 
identifying the newly-registered domain as one of mali-
cious and potentially malicious in response to determin-
ing that the number of unique name servers exceeds the 
predetermined threshold of servers; and 
responsive to identifying the newly-registered domain as 
one of malicious and potentially malicious: 
identifying an IP address associated with a registration 
record for the newly-registered domain, and 10 
determining a confidence level based on whether the IP 
address is associated with a tainted server. 
11. A computer-implemented method for identifying an 
Internet domain as potentially malicious comprising: 
identifying unique name servers that query the Internet 
domain during a first day; 
identifying unique name servers that query the domain 
during a second day; 
15 
determining, by a processor, a similarity of the unique 20 
name servers that queried the Internet domain during the 
first day and the unique name servers that queried the 
Internet domain during the second day; 
determining, by the processor, that the similarity meets a 
predetermined threshold; 
identifying the Internet domain as one of malicious and 
potentially malicious in response to determining that the 
similarity meets the predetermined threshold; 
25 
determining a confidence level based on a difference 
between the similarity and the predetermined threshold; 30 
and 
automatically adding the domain to a blacklist when the 
confidence level is high. 
12. The method of claim 11, further comprising: 
identifying unique name servers that query the domain for 
35 
a series of days, and wherein determining the similarity 
further comprises calculating a series of values repre-
senting the similarity of the unique name servers that 
query the domain for pairs of consecutive days in the 40 
series of days; 
analyzing the series of values for high variability; and 
identifying the domain as one of malicious and potentially 
malicious when the series of values demonstrates high 
variability. 
13. The method of claim 11, wherein determining the simi-
larity comprises calculating a Jaccard index. 
14. The method of claim 11, further comprising: 
45 
determining a confidence level based on a difference 
between the similarity and the predetermined threshold; 50 
and 
limiting traffic to the domain when the confidence level is 
not high. 
15. The method of claim 11, further comprising: adjusting 
55 
the predetermined threshold based on data used to flag the 
domain as one of malicious and potentially malicious. 
16. A system for identifying an Internet domain as poten-
tially malicious comprising: 
a processor; and 60 
a memory having instructions that, when executed by the 
processor, cause the processor to perform operations 
comprising: 
identifying unique name servers that query the domain 
during a first day, 65 
identifying unique name servers that query the domain 
during a second day, 
16 
determining, by a processor, the similarity of the name 
servers that queried the domain during the first day 
and the name servers that queried the domain during 
the second day, 
determining, by the processor, that the similarity meets a 
predetermined threshold; 
identifying the domain as one of malicious and poten-
tially malicious in response to determining that the 
similarity of the servers meets the predetermined 
threshold; 
determining a confidence level based on a difference 
between the similarity of the servers and the predeter-
mined threshold; and 
automatically adding the domain to a blacklist when the 
confidence level is high. 
17. The system of claim 16, wherein the operations further 
comprise: 
identifying unique name servers that query the domain for 
a series of days, and wherein determining the similarity 
further comprises calculating a series of values repre-
senting the similarity of the unique name servers that 
query the domain for pairs of consecutive days in the 
series of days; 
analyzing the series of values for high variability; and 
identifying the domain as one of malicious and potentially 
malicious when the series of values demonstrates high 
variability. 
18. The system of claim 16, wherein the operations further 
comprise: 
determining a confidence level based on a difference 
between the similarity and the predetermined threshold; 
and 
limiting traffic to the domain when the confidence level is 
not high. 
19. A tangible non-transitory computer-readable medium 
storing instructions for identifying an Internet domain as 
potentially malicious, the instructions causing one or more 
computer processors to perform operations, comprising: 
identifying unique name servers that query the domain 
during a first day; 
identifying unique name servers that query the domain 
during a second day; determining the similarity of the 
name servers that queried the domain during the first day 
and the name servers that queried the domain during the 
second day; 
determining that the similarity meets a predetermined 
threshold; 
identifying the domain as one of malicious and potentially 
malicious in response to determining that the similarity 
of the servers meets a predetermined threshold; 
determining a confidence level based on a difference 
between the similarity and the predetermined threshold; 
and 
automatically adding the domain to a blacklist when the 
confidence level is high. 
20. A computer-implemented method for identifying an 
Internet domain as potentially malicious comprising: 
identifying, by a processor, a set of domains, the set includ-
ing at least one known malicious domain; 
determining, by the processor, a number of name servers 
that query each domain in the set of domains for each 
day over a period of time; 
for a plurality of pairs of domains from the set of domains, 
analyzing a similarity of name servers that queried a first 
domain of the pair of domains and name servers that 
queried a second domain of the pair of domains; 
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grouping domains in the set of domains based on the ana-
lyzing; 
identifying domains in a group that contains the known 
malicious domain as one of malicious and potentially 
malicious; 
18 
grouping the domains based on the analyzing; 
identifying domains in a group that contains the known 
malicious domain as one of malicious and potentially 
malicious; 
determining a confidence level for each group of 
domains that the domains in the group are malicious; 
and 
automatically adding a domain to a blacklist when the 
confidence level is high. 
determining a confidence level for each group of domains 
that the domains in the group are malicious; and 
automatically adding a domain to a blacklist when the 
confidence level is high. 
21. The method of claim 20, wherein each server is an 
aggregation of servers sharing a same IP address prefix. 
10 
26. The system of claim 25, wherein each server in the set 
of servers is an aggregation of servers sharing a same IP 
address prefix. 
22. The method of claim 20, wherein analyzing the simi-
larity comprises calculating a pairwise Jaccard index for the 
pair of domains. 15 
27. The system of claim 25, wherein the operations further 
comprise: 
determining a confidence level for each group of domains 
that the domains in the group are malicious; and 
limiting the traffic to a domain when the confidence level is 
not high. 
23. The method of claim 20, wherein the identifying 
domains includes automatically adding the domains to a 
blacklist. 
24. The method of claim 20, further comprising: 
determining a confidence level for each group of domains 
that the domains in the group are malicious; and 
limiting traffic to a domain when the confidence level is not 
high. 
28. A tangible non-transitory computer-readable medium 
storing instructions for identifying an Internet domain as 
20 potentially malicious, the instructions causing one or more 
computer processors to perform operations, comprising: 
identifying a set of domains, the set including at least one 
known malicious domain; 
25. A system for identifying an Internet domain as poten-
tially malicious comprising: 
a processor; and 
a memory having instructions that, when executed by the 
processor, cause the processor to perform operations 
comprising: 
25 
identifying, by a processor, a set of domains, the set 30 
including at least one known malicious domain, 
determining, by the processor, a number of name servers 
that query each domain in the set of domains for each 
day over a period of time, 
for a plurality of pairs of domains from the set of 35 
domains, analyzing a similarity of name servers that 
queried a first domain of the pair of domains and name 
servers that queried a second domain of the pair of 
domains, 
determining a number of name servers that query each 
domain in the set of domains for each day over a period 
of time; 
for a plurality of pairs of domains from the set of domains, 
analyzing a similarity of name servers that queried a first 
domain of the pair of domains and name servers that 
queried a second domain of the pair of domains; 
grouping the domains based on the analyzing; 
identifying domains in a group that contains the known 
malicious domain as one of malicious and potentially 
malicious; 
determining a confidence level for each group of domains 
that the domains in the group are malicious; and 
automatically adding a domain to a blacklist when the 
confidence level is high. 
* * * * * 
